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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard David Pokorney appeals from his judgment and conviction for five 
counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs 
Pokorney was arrested for domestic violence and his wife obtained a 
protective order. (1 1/30/06 Narrative Police Report of B. Smith, p. I (attached to 
PSI).) Thereafter three of Pokorney's sons, W.P. (age 1 I),  J.P. (age 4) and R.P. 
(age 8). disclosed that Pokorney had sexually abused them (a fourth, also with 
the initials R.P.' (age 16), denied any sexual contact with Pokorney). (Id.) The 
police arranged interviews and medical examinations of the boys by child sexual 
abuse specialists at CARES. (Id.) During the interviews, conducted on 
December 11, 2006, and December 13, 2006, the three minor boys who had 
previously disclosed stated that Pokorney had sexually abused them, and two 
stated they had been physically abused. (Id. at pp. 1-3.) On December 20, 
2006, an adult son of Pokorney, J.G., stated in a police interview that Pokorney 
had sexually molested him starting when he was around I 1  and continuing until 
he was 13 or 14 years old. (Id., at p. 3.') 
On December 21, 2006, Pokorney sent a letter to R.P.2, the sixteen-year- 
old son who had not disclosed sexual abuse. (R., pp. 21-37; State's Exhibit 2.) 
' Hereinafter "R.P.2." 
* More information about the CARES interviews and medical examinations are 
included in the interview summaries, psychosociat reports, and medical reports, 
also attached to the PSI. 
In the letter Pokorney stated that his oldest son, J.G., had learned that Pokorney 
was on the sex offender registry and that Pokorney told J.G. "how easily I could 
get in trouble if I was further accused by, say, his drunk friends." (R., p. 27.) 
Pokorney stated that he was on the registry because "while high on 
hallucinogenic mushrooms and wine I let a teenager perform oral sex on me." 
(Id.) Pokorney stated that the teenager had offered to perform the oral sex; that 
it was not "the crime of the century;" that the teenager's mother only reported the 
incident when Pokorney refused her sexual advances; that he could have "beat 
the charge" but instead "told the truth;" and that he was given probation, but was 
put in prison on a probation violation because of "crooked businessman and 
corrupt prosecutors." (Id.) 
Pokorney also wrote that he dealt with the "false guilt" caused by his 
conviction, which was "heaped on" him by "unscrupulous and unenlightened" 
people who stood to gain financially by making normal human behavior into 
serious crimes. (Id.) Pokorney then explained that "Spontaneous, opportunist 
sex acts between those of the same sex does nothing to change the long-term 
sexual orientation of those involved." (R., p. 28.) "My so-called 'victim' harbours 
no damage and harbours no hate towards me (nor I towards him)." (Id.) "There 
is big-time money in the sex-addiction, sex-abuse field, as well as in the 
exploding criminal-justice system - thats [sic] why its [sic] everywhere." (Id.) 
Pokorney then explained that "Uncle Fred," "Uncle Greg," "Chuck Taylor," 
"Linda Taylor" and others had many problems stemming from their inability to 
deal with their true sexuality. (R., pp. 29-31.) The story concluded by pointing 
out that "Chuck got 12 years in prison" for being sexually involved with a step- 
daughter, and the Taylors' children "lost their dad and mom and now are being 
raised by strangers in group homes that are known to produce disfunctional [sic] 
kids." (R., p. 31.) Pokorney stated: "The government hurt whenever they could 
and helped nobody. It could and should have been handled differently, and 
making such a statement doesn't make me pro-sex abuse: it makes me 
enlightened." (Id.) 
Pokorney next stated he had been made aware that "some of my boys 
have said I sexually molested them." (R., p. 32.) "if your [sic] one of the 
accusers, shame on you ...." (Id.) After pointing out that his oldest boy is "to 
[sic] old" and the younger boys "don't know enough about sex to make a lie 
work," Pokorney told R.P.2: "I know you're mad at me but I can't believe you 
would stoop so low or that anyone would believe you ... ." (Id.) 
Pokorney then explained that the whole thing was a plot by R.P.2's mother 
to get the boys from him, and that the deterioration of the marriage and the family 
problems were the fault of R.P.2's mother despite his best efforts. (R., pp. 32- 
Pokorney next addressed the domestic violence call to the police that had 
landed him in jail: 
When the police came she should have ran [sic] outside and 
told them that she attacked me and if anyone went to jail is should 
be her. The police should have told you to quit being so dramatic, 
to do what your dad says and told Linda [the mother] to quit hitting 
me. You know that - mom knows that, but doing the right thing is 
sometimes hard. Still, it's what makes real self-esteem. 
(R., p. 34.) Pokorney then accuses R.P.2's mother of "not acting morally" 
because she is "using the government to hurt me." (Id.) 
On the next page: "Even if I were guilty of some kind of sex thing with the 
kids - why would your mom call the police and try to get me into legal trouble? 
To hurt me." (R., p. 35.) Pokorney then claimed that if his sons or R.P.2's mom 
made a mistake he would try to help instead of trying to hurt. (Id.) 
Finally, in a post script, Pokorney wrote: 
The thing that hurts me the most is the utter lack of 
compassion ... even worst [sic] then [sic] the lack of loyalty. I can't 
grasp this lack of compassion coming from my family. I simply 
don't get it. Where's the love? 
(R., p. 37 (ellipsis original).) 
The grand jury indicted Pokorney on seven counts of lewd conduct with a 
child relating to four of his sons. (R., pp. 8-10.) The state provided notice of its 
intent to use Pokorney's letter to R.P.2 as evidence under I.R.E. 404(b). (R., pp. 
21-37.) The state also provided notice of intent to call the victim of Pokorney's 
prior sexual abuse, whom he referenced in the letter. (Addendum Notice (filed 
under seal).) Although no objection to this evidence is found in the record, the 
judge apparently raised the issue. (Tr., p. 2, Ls. 20-22.) The court entertained 
argument by both sides. (Tr., p. 2, L. 23 - p. 14, L. 13.) Before trial the court 
ruled that the evidence of the prior molestation was admissible. (Tr., p. 53, L. 25 
- p. 55, L. 5.) 
At the trial Pokorney's son J.G. testified that Pokorney began sexually 
abusing him when J.G. was eleven or twelve years old, in about 1995. (Tr., p. 
105, L. 17 - p. 11 1, L. 7.) Pokorney would have J.G. either masturbate him or 
give him oral sex until he ejaculated in J.G.'s mouth. (Tr., p. 111, Ls. 5-14; p. 
115, Ls. 13-24.) W.P. testified that Pokorney began sexually abusing him when 
W.P. was nine, in about 2004. (Tr., p. 145, L. 9 - p. 157, L. 2; p. 176, L. 3 - p. 
178, L. 10.) Pokorney would touch W.P.'s penis after the shower about once per 
week. (Tr., p. 149, L. 5 - p. 154, L. 16.) R.P. testified that Pokorney molested 
him by rubbing his penis on R.P.'s penis over his clothes while they were in bed 
together, when R.P. was in first through third grades in about 2005-06. (Tr., p. 
198, L. 11 - p. 210, L. 15.) The youngest son, J.P., age five, had trouble 
testifying, but denied that anyone had ever touched his penis or put a penis in his 
mouth. (Tr., p. 263, L. I - p. 269, L. 20.) The state later dismissed one of the 
counts (Count IV) related to oral-genital contact with J.P., but kept the count 
regarding manual-genital contact (Count Ill) because W.P. had testified having 
witnessed that behavior. (Tr., p. 361, Ls. 2-18.) 
The state also called B.W., who testified that when he was younger his 
family and Pokorney's family were friends. (Tr., p. 236, L. 16 - p. 242, L. 1.) 
When B.W. was twelve Pokorney gave him a ride from Pokorney's father's house 
back to his own house, in a nearby city. (Tr., p. 242, L. 2 - p. 244, L. 14.) 
Pokorney stopped first at his own home, where he took off his clothes except his 
underwear and offered B.W. a beer. (Tr., p. 244, L. 18 - p. 246, L. 6.) Pokorney 
asked if B.W. wanted to touch him. (Tr., p. 246, L. 7 - p. 247, L. 16.) They left 
again in Pokorney's truck, but instead of taking B.W. home Pokorney drove to a 
remote location. (Tr., p. 247, L. 17 - p. 248, L. 5.) Pokorney let B.W. drive, then 
started touching his legs and crotch, asking if B.W. wanted him to "touch him off." 
(Tr., p. 248, L. 6 - p. 249, L. 13.) B.W. stopped the truck, and Pokorney told him 
he wanted B.W. to give him oral sex. (Tr., p. 249, Ls. 9-19.) B.W. attempted to 
run away, but Pokorney forced him back to the truck where he forced B.W. to 
perform oral sex on him. (Tr., p. 249, L. 20 - p. 253, L. 7.) B.W. told his brother 
that night, his brother told their mother the next morning, and their mother 
immediately took him to the police. (Tr., p. 256, L. 8 - p. 257, L. 18.) 
At trial the state also called as a witness Pokorney's wife and the mother 
of the children. (Tr., p. 270, L. 10 - p. 275, L. 21 .) She testified about where the 
family had lived and the general circumstances of the boys' disclosure of the 
sexual abuse. (Tr., p. 275, L. 22 - p. 283, L. 19.) She also laid foundation for 
admission of State's Exhibit I ,  which was excerpts of the letter Pokorney had 
written to R.P.2. (Tr., p. 283, L. 20 - p. 290, L. 3.) She further testified that 
Pokorney had told her that between their divorce and reconciliation he had been 
sexually involved with a 17-year-old girl. (Tr., p. 290, L. 4 - p. 292, L. 12.) 
Pokorney later admitted it had been a boy, from whom he had received oral sex 
to drive his truck, but he never stated the age of the boy. (Tr., p. 292, L. 13 - p. 
294, L. 11 .) Pokorney then moved for admission of the entire letter, which the 
court granted with the exception of allegations that his wife, Linda Gohn, had 
been molested as a child.3 (Tr., p. 352, L. 13 - p. 359, L. 5; Defendant's Exhibit 
A.) 
The court also accepted an unredacted copy of the letter as Exhibit 2, which did 
not go to the jury. (Tr., p. 357, L. 10 - p. 358, L. 2.) 
Pokorney testified in his own defense. (Tr., p. 437, Ls. 11-15.) He 
generally claimed that his ex-wife had motive to coach the children into 
fabricating claims against him so that she could retain custody of them, and that 
his ex-wife and oldest son, victim J.G., knew about the sex offense in Montana 
involving B.W., and therefore knew that Pokorney would be vulnerable to a 
charge of child sexual abuse. (Tr., p. 437, L. 13 - p. 490, L. 11; p. 497, L. 7 - p. 
498, L. 9.) In his closing arguments Pokorney asserted that the case was about 
child custody, and that his wife, who knew of the prior charge, arranged the 
allegations while he was in jail. (Tr., p. 535, L. 2 - p. 550, L. 21.) He also argued 
that J.G. had fabricated the charges because he knew that sex abuse was 
Pokorney's "Achilles' heel" in the sense he was very vulnerable to such charges 
"because of a mistake I made 24 years ago." (Tr., p. 543, Ls. 5-24.) 
The jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts 1 and 2, and 5 through 7, and 
not guilty on Count 3. (R., pp. 109-10; Tr., p. 560, L. 16 - p. 561, L. 17.) The 
court later entered judgment, imposing and executing concurrent sentences of 
life with thirty years fixed. (R., pp. 115-18.) Pokorney timely filed a notice of 
appeal. (R., pp. 119-21.) 
ISSUE 
Pokorney states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by admitting highly prejudicial Rule 
404(b) evidence that was not relevant to any issue other than 
propensity? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Pokorney failed to show that the district court erred in admitting his 
letter to his second son in which he discussed his prior sexual abuse of a child as 
a reason his sons would fabricate claims of sexual abuse, or err in admitting 
evidence of that actual sexual abuse? 
ARGUMENT 
Pokornev Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Admittinq 
Evidence Of Pokornev's Sexual Abuse Of A Bov In Montana As Contained In 
Pokornev's Own Letter To One Of His Sons And Through The Testimonv Of The 
Victim 
A. Introduction 
The district court allowed the state to present evidence that after his 
marriage and the birth of his first son, Pokorney sexually abused a twelve-year- 
old boy in Montana. (Tr., p. 53, L. 25 - p. 55, L. 5.) At trial Pokorney presented 
the defense theory that his wife and oldest son had arranged the fabrication of 
sexual abuse charges against him in part because they knew he was vulnerable 
to such charges due to his conviction in Montana. (Tr., p. 437, L. 13 - p. 490, L. 
I I; p. 497, L. 7 - p. 498, L. 9.) On appeal, however, Pokorney argues that it was 
error to admit evidence of his prior sexual offense. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-17.) 
Review of the record and application of relevant law shows that Pokorney has 
failed to show an abuse of discretion. In the alternative, even if some of the 
evidence of the prior sexual abuse by Pokorney was inadmissible, the error was 
harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, -, 205 P.3d 
1 185, 1 187 (2009). 
C. Pokorne~ Has Failed To Demonstrate That Admission Of The Evidence Of 
Pokorney's Prior Sexual Abuse Of A BOV In Montana Was Preiudicial 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to pmve the 
character of the defendant in an attempt to show he or she committed the crime 
for which he or she is on trial. State v. Grist, 147 ldaho 49, -, 205 P.3d 1185, 
11 88 (2009). However, such evidence is admissible for other purposes, 
including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Philli~s, 123 
ldaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Tolman, 121 ldaho 899, 828 P.2d 
1304 (1992); State v. Moore, 120 ldaho 743, 819 P.2d 1143 (1991); State v. 
Gauna, 117 ldaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). Evidence of prior 
bad acts is admissible if (a) it is relevant to prove some issue other than the 
defendant's character, and (b) its probative value for the proper purpose is not 
substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice. State v. Cross, 
132 ldaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999). The second prong of this test 
only excludes evidence if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs 
its probative value. State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964- 
65 (2003). 
The letter Pokorney wrote to his son R.P.2 was admissible evidence. 
Although it does relate Pokorney's version of events in Montana involving sexual 
abuse of a 12-year-old boy who is not his son, it shows that Pokorney was trying 
to manipulate his son, R.P.2. Pokorney claimed that he does not know who had 
accused him of sexual abuse, but did his utmost to convince R.P.2 that R.P.2's 
mother and older brother are behind fabricating evidence and that no one would 
believe R.P.2 if he was the one disclosing sexual abuse. As part of that attempt 
at manipulation he asserts that it is because of the prior sexual abuse that the 
mother and older brother know Pokorney is vulnerable to fabricated charges of 
sexual abuse, that the prior abuse (and presumably any current abuse) are 
natural, not harmful, and not really a problem. He further asserts that to the 
extent sexual abuse of his sons is harmful it is petty of the boy's mother to not 
seek help outside the criminal justice system, which is destructive of individuals 
and families, using examples of parents who ended up in prison and children 
who ended in foster homes. Remembering the intended audience of the letter, 
the letter appears to be an attempt by Pokorney to manipulate his teenage son 
into taking his side, because no one would believe him, he would end up sending 
his father to prison, and he would likely end up in foster care himself. 
Part of proving that the letter was an attempt at manipulation included 
admitting the testimony of the victim of the Montana sexual abuse to show that 
Pokorney was deliberately minimizing that episode as part of his manipulation 
attempt. in the letter Pokorney represented that the prior abuse happened when 
he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol; that the victim had initiated the 
sexual contact; that the whole case was pressed by an unscrupulous system; 
and that the event had no deleterious effect on the victim, all of which were 
disproved by the prior victim's testimony. 
The evidence of the prior sexual abuse in Montana, in conjunction with the 
other parts of the letter, was admissible to show a plan or scheme by Pokorney 
to manipulate his son into recanting any allegations of sexual abuse he might 
have made, and to put pressure on other family members to not support the 
pursuit of criminal charges. Such evidence shows consciousness of guilt and 
puts other evidence into context, such as explaining why his sons may not have 
disclosed the abuse they suffered until months or years after it happened. The 
evidence is relevant to matters other than bad character, and the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in weighing its probative value. 
Pokorney, relying primarily on State v. Grist, 147 ldaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 
(2009), contends that the evidence was relevant only to show character because 
the only similarities of the prior event and the current event were similarities of 
age and circumstances of the victims, grounds found insufficient for admission of 
evidence in Grist. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-13.~) A closer review of Grist, 
however, shows that it does not forbid the admission of the letter or the testimony 
of the prior victim. 
The Court in Grist discussed admission of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) to 
corroborate a victim and to show a common scheme or plan. It did not state that 
evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible for this purpose, but emphasized that if 
Pokorney also argues that the district court "abuse[d] its discretion" by 
"appl[ying] the wrong legal standard" to its relevancy determination, particularly 
as set forth in Grist. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) The state notes that the district 
court could not have applied the analysis of Grist because that case had not yet 
been decided. In addition, the argument is irrelevant because the question of 
relevance is reviewed de novo, not for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 
Idaho 49, -, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009). 
the only relevance of the evidence was that it tended to show that because the 
defendant did it before he probably did it again it was not properly considered 
evidence of either corroboration or a common scheme or plan. Grist, 147 Idaho 
a t ,  205 P.3d at 1190 ("The unstated premise in Moore is simply this: 'If he 
did it before, he probably did it this time as well.' This complete reliance upon 
propensity is not a permissible basis for the admission of evidence of uncharged 
misconduct.") The Court went on, however, to point out that prior bad act 
evidence can be admissible to corroborate or show a common plan or scheme. 
Id. at -, - 205 P.3d at 1190-91. The Court cautioned that district courts should 
scrutinize whether evidence offered to show corroboration or common scheme or 
plan "actually serves the articulated purpose or whether such evidence is merely 
propensity evidence served up under a different name." Id. at -, 205 P.3d at 
1191. 
Here the evidence is admissible for purposes other than mere propensity. 
As noted above, the letter, including the parts where Pokorney talks about the 
abuse in Montana, is admissible to show an attempt by Pokorney to manipulate 
one of his sons into believing that sex abuse is either natural or at least no big 
deal and that the accusations against him are fabricated by the son's mother and 
older brother, based in part upon their knowledge of the prior abuse. He also 
tries to convince the son that it is morally and ethically wrong to deal with sexual 
abuse through the criminal justice system, again after portraying his prior 
conviction as a miscarriage of justice caused by corrupt people pushing a sex 
abuse industry. The testimony of the prior victim is relevant to show that 
Pokorney's minimization of his own prior conduct was part of that manipulation. 
In short, the evidence is relevant for far more than merely to show that Pokorney 
likely committed the charged acts because he had committed similar acts before. 
D. Even If Admission Of Some Or All Of The Prior Bad Act Evidence Was 
Error, The Error Was Harmless 
"If irrelevant evidence is admitted, then the focus on appeal should be 
whether or not such error prejudiced the objecting party." White v. Mock, 140 
ldaho 882, 891, 104 P.3d 356, 365 (2004) (citing State v. Cannady, 137 ldaho 
67, 70, 44 P.3d 1122, 1125 (2002)). See also I.R.E. 103(a) ("Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected...."); I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."). Where 
evidence is erroneously admitted, the test is "'whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the 
conviction and that the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Jones, 125 ldaho 477,488, 873 P.2d 122, 
133 (1994) (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 ldaho 742, 762, 810 P.2d 680, 700 
(1991) (emphasis added)); see also State v. Zimmerman, 121 ldaho 971, 976, 
829 P.2d 861, 865 (1992) (to hold erroneous admission of evidence harmless, 
court must "'declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no 
reasonable possibility that [the] evidence complained of contributed to the 
conviction"') (brackets original) (quoting State v. Sharp, 101 ldaho 498, 507, 616 
P.2d 1034, 1043 (1 980)). 
In this case the record shows the admission of the evidence was 
harmless. "The prejudicial effect of character evidence is that it induces the jury 
to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial 
because he is a man of criminal character. Character evidence, therefore, takes 
the jury away from their primary consideration of the guilt or innocence of the 
particular crime on trial." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, -, 205 P.3d 11 85, 11 88 
(2009) (brackets, cites and quotation marks omitted). The record in this case 
shows that the jury was not distracted from the consideration of the guilt or 
innocence of the particular crime on trial, but instead decided their verdict based 
on the evidence of guilt for the charged acts. 
First, the trial court specifically instructed the jury on the proper use of 
evidence of uncharged misconduct. (Tr., p. 93, Ls. 3-1 1.) Thus, it is clear from 
the record that the jury was adequately apprised of the proper uses and 
limitations of the evidence. 
In addition, although Pokorney objected to the admission of the evidence 
and did not invite its introduction, he clearly presented a defense theory to take 
advantage of its admission. The prosecutor made no reference to the evidence 
of prior bad acts in closing, instead telling the jury that they must decide the case 
based on the credibility of the testimony of the victims. (Tr., p. 521, L. 5 - p. 534, 
L. 21 .) It was Pokorney himself who in closing argument focused on the prior act 
of sexual abuse in making his argument that his wife and oldest son had 
fabricated the evidence because they knew he was particularly vulnerable to a 
charge of sexual abuse because of that prior bad act. (Tr., p. 535, Ls. 2-10; p. 
542, L. 22 - p. 543, L. 24; p. 547, Ls. 1-12.) He also argued his oldest son was 
less credible because he was not as emotional as B.W. on the stand. (Tr., p. 
543, Ls. 5-16.) He further argued that the jury should not believe he was a bad 
person because of that incident. (Tr., p. 549, Ls. 6-22.) The prosecutor 
responded by pointing out that getting the jury to convict because of the prior 
sexual abuse "wasn't the point of the testimony." (Tr., p. 554, L. 22 - p. 555, L. 
2.) If the mother or oldest son were trying to frame the defendant, they would 
have provided the police with information about the prior abuse. (Tr., p. 555, Ls. 
3-16.) The state then argued that it was Pokorney who had used the fact of prior 
abuse to try to manipulate his children. (Tr., p. 555, Ls. 17-21.) The closing 
arguments indicate that the jury was encouraged to apply the prior bad act 
evidence not as evidence of Pokorney's guilt, but as evidence of either motive of 
others to frame Pokorney or as evidence that he was using that event to 
manipulate his children. 
Finally, the record also indicates that the jury did in fact follow the jury 
instructions and argument and decided the case on the credibility of the victims 
and not the fact of the prior bad act. The jury ultimately convicted on each count 
in which the victim took the stand and described the abuse. (Tr., p. 560, L. 19 - 
p. 561, L. 17 (finding guilt on counts 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7.) On the count where the 
victim (the youngest son) had denied the abuse (Tr., p. 263, L. 1 - p. 269, L. 20), 
and the state had relied on testimony of another brother who testified he had 
witnessed the abuse (Tr., p. 156, L. 3 - p. 157, L. 2; p. 179, Ls. 10-20; p. 361, Ls. 
2-18), the jury acquitted (Tr., p. 561, Ls. 6-7 (not guilty on Count 3)). The fact 
that the jury acquitted even though there was sufficient evidence to support a 
<' - 
conviction for Count 3 (Tr., p. 408, L. 22 - p. 41 1, L. 14), is strong evidence that 
the jury was not deliberating in a state of prejudice to the defendant because of 
the prior act of sexual abuse. 
As articulate above, the evidence of the prior sexual abuse in Montana 
was admissible. To the extent this Court determines some or even all of it was 
inadmissible, any error in its admission was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction 
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